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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW




Ideas about reform of the automobile reparations system are
currently spoken and published in such abundance' that the
bibliographical analogue of a chart and compass have become
essential to finding one's way through the maze. My primary purpose
in these remarks is to offer a chart.
A good chart must be objective. Some people - not excluding
good friends - may believe I am not able to achieve objectivity
in constructing a chart concerning the reparations system. But I
take a different view, and I am encouraged in that more positive
expectation since the chart I propose to describe is, of course,
to be used with a compass. And the compass I have in mind points
unerringly to a system of nonfault insurance.
The chart to be constructed, then, concerns not whether but
how we might proceed to a "nonfault" or "no-fault"2 reparations
system. That is, it concerns the alternative routes among which we
must choose if we are to adopt a nonfault system.
I believe it is now clear that some form of nonfault insurance
will become the prevailing automobile accident reparations system
in the United States in the immediate future. If you disagree,
then I invite you to consider the problem as you would a law
school hypothetical, and I hope that the intellectual exercise will
some day bear fruit - as law teachers, if not always their students
* Professor Keeton presented his views on this subject to the West Virginia
Bar Association in October, 1971, at Pipestem State Park, West Virginia.
** Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.B.A., University of Texas,
1940, L.L.B., 1941; S.J.D., Harvard, 1956.
1 See, e.g., J. Volpe, Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and Their Compensation
in the United States, A Report to Congress and the President (U.S. Dep't of
Transp. Auto Ins. & Comp. Study 1971); KING, The Insurance Industry and
Compensation Plans, 43 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 1137 (1968); ROAKES, ATrroMoBniE
INDEMNFC ATON PROPOSALS-A CoMPENDrum (1968).
21 use the terms "nonfault" and "no-fault" interchangeably. If "nonfault"
or "no-fault" is a hidden persuader, I believe it has only become so
because of growing acceptance of the principle each of these terms suggests.
Various observers have expressed exactly opposite views as to whether "non-
fault" is a better hidden persuader than "no-fault" or vice versa.
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and former students, firmly believe to be the case with other
hypotheticals.
IT. THE COMMON ELEMENTS OF NONFAULT INSURANCE PROPOSALS
The central theme of all nonfault automobile insurance proposals
is that for compensating victims of traffic accidents they depend
primarily on that concept of insurance now identified as nonfault
insurance. It turns out, however, that under other names this is
the most ancient of all known concepts of insurance. It is at least as
ancient as the fraternal societies of early civilizations. This concept
is basically the same idea that we find to be the essence of life
insurance, health and accident insurance and fire insurance. It is the
concept that the criterion for determining whether benefits shall be
paid will be whether the claimant has suffered a loss from the type
of accident described in the insuring clause of the policy.
One of the implications of that criterion is that fault is irrelevant
to the determination of compensation. A completely separate issue
is the question whether fault will be relevant to determining
responsibility for paying premiums into the system.3 Certainly there
is a lack of consistency among the many proposals - all of the
different routes to nonfault insurance - on this second issue. But
they are consistent on the first issue of using a criterion for benefits
that is the nonfault criterion - the straightforward insurance
principle.
For most persons speaking and writing about this issue, the
several different paths to nonfault insurance have in common some
other implications as well. It is explicit or implicit in most such
proposals that nonfault insurance will be first party insurance, that
is, that the claim for benefits of the injured person will ordinarily be
a claim against his own insurance company without any third party
involved. Such a claim stands in contrast with the typical claim
under the liability insurance coverage in which there is a third party,
involved, the other driver, and in which the theory of the system is
that benefits are being paid on his behalf, the insurance being in
form at least one designed to protect his assets against inroads
incident to his liability-based on his fault.
In practice, of course, automobile liability insurance has in fact
been used for a purpose of assuring compensation to victims rather
3 See, e.g., Compensation Systems - The Search for a Viable Alternative
to Negligence Law 70-76 (1971), reprinted from P. KETON & R. KETON,
CASE AND MATERIALS ON TH LAW oF ToRTs ch. 7 (1971) [cited hereinafter
as Compensation Systemsl.
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than simply to protect the assets of wrongdoers. Thus, the present
system has developed complications incident to a practical use for a
different purpose than the underlying theory.4
In contrast with this very ancient concept of nonfault insurance,
liability insurance (or, under the newspeak, "fault insurance") is
relatively recent in origin. This idea was invented only in the
nineteenth century. It first came into vogue as a form of insurance
designed to protect the employer against the consequences of what
is called "employers' liability" - that is, liability of the employer
for injuries to his workmen. This occurred at a time before
workmen's compensation had been developed.
Of course, the moment the automobile came upon the scene
and its propensities for causing injuries to others became apparent,
the liability insurance concept was quickly adapted to the automobile
case.
Liability insurance, then, is a relatively recent concept. In
moving toward nonfault insurance for the compensation of traffic
victims, we are not abandoning the wisdom of centuries as so many
opponents of nonfault insurance have argued. Instead, we are simply
returning to a more ancient wisdom - the concept of straightforward
insurance.
Another idea common to most nonfault insurance proposals is
that benefits will be paid periodically rather than in one lump
sum. In the tort-and-liability-insurance system, it is customary for
compensation to be determined once and forever by a judgment
in a single lawsuit or settlement. Predictions are made as to what
the losses will be in the future, and, of course, those predictions
are always wrong since it is impossible for man to predict these losses
accurately. In contrast, nonfault insurance proposals would provide
for the payment of losses as they occur, in most instances month by
month.
In some plans there are also provisions for special methods of
adjudicating disputes' and provisions for objective criteria of
4Cf. NEw YORK INS. DEP'T REPORT, Automobile Insurance . . . For
Whose Benefit? 13-14, 44-48 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. INS. DEP'T
REPORT].5 E.g., the Columbia Plan proposed an administrative board comparable
to those used in many states for workmen's compensation claims. COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE
COMMIrTE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE AccmENTs (1932).
In contrast, most current plans propose that jury trial be available for the
resolution of disputed fact issues.
(Vol. 74
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compensation for things beyond medical expense and wage loss.'
On these matters there are substantial variations among the different
plans.
III. FivE ROUTES OF REFoRm
Up to this point we have been considering the principal
characteristics of nonfault insurance coverage itself. On these
matters, despite differences in detail, there is a large measure of
similarity among the different plans. Turn now to that area with
respect to which choices must be made among alternative routes
to reform having very different characteristics. The key question is:
To what extent will claims based on fault be eliminated or limited?
It may be helpful to identify five distinctive positions that are in
a sense but points along a spectrum of possibilities.
The most extreme position is the position that goes furthest
toward eliminating claims based upon fault. This position is taken
by the American Insurance Association,7 by the New York Insurance
Department,' and by State Senator Davies of Minnesota.9
These three proposals all have in common the proposition that
they would eliminate tort actions almost completely. The only reason
for the qualifier "almost" is that there are some exceptional provisions
for "residual" tort actions. For example, the New York plan proposes
to retain a right to recover tort damages against what are referred to
as "obnoxious drivers": drunken drivers, drug addicts, fleeing felons,
and so forth. The New York report lists several kinds of drivers that
most persons would agree deserve some kind of punishment. Instead
of leaving punishment in those cases to the criminal law system, or
to license revocation or suspension, the New York proposal would
preserve tort actions.1" As you think about the volume of cases,
you will recognize that these cases amount to only a tiny percentage
of all cases. For practical purposes, then, we can say of this set of
6 E.g., the American Mutual Insurance Alliance's Guaranteed Benefits
Plan provides up to $7,500 of "medical impairments benefits" for 100%
impairment and a proportionate amount for impairment less than 100%.
This plan is summarized in Compensation Systems 26-28.7A_ rEcAN INsuRANcE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMITTEE
TO STUDY AND EVALUATE TiE KEToN-O'CoNNELL BASIC PROTCTION PLAN
AND AUTOMOBILE AccmENT REPARATIONS (1968) rhereinafter cited as AIA
REPORT1.
8 N.Y. INS. DEP'T REPORT 83-100.
9 Davies, The Minnesota Proposal for No-Fault Auto Insurance, 54
MINN. L. Rnv. 921 (1970).10 N.Y. INS. DEP'T REPORT 83-100.
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proposals - the American Insurance Association proposal, the New
York Department proposal, and Senator Davies" proposal in
Minnesota - that they would virtually eliminate tort actions. When
one takes that extreme position, he is faced very promptly with what
may be called a cost-equity dilemma."
Perhaps all of us would agree that there will be some categories
of injured persons - persons suffering certain types of injuries -
who deserve more compensation than just reimbursement for their
economic losses, if we are to be equitable as between these groups
of vicitims and all other groups of victims.
Consider two examples: First, the "clean, quick" amputation;
no more than five hundred dollars of medical expense; a person
with an office job; no loss of income except for the brief time he was
out for the medical treatment. To pay that person no more than the
medical expense and wage loss is to give no consideration to the
drastic change in his life style that results from this kind of injury.
Such a system is open to the charge that it is being unfair -
inequitable as between this type of victim and another type of victim
who has much greater medical expense and wage loss, but who
eventually recovers fully within a year or two and consequently has
no drastic change in his long-term life style comparable to that of
the person with the immediate amputation.
It is on that basis of the inequity of doing nothing special about
grievous harms beyond economic loss that Professor O'Connell and I
came to the conclusion that we could not, on principle - and not
simply as a political judgment, as has so often been charged -
support a proposal that made no provision for special compensation
in cases of this type.
A second illustration involving somewhat similar problems of
equity is that of a young girl who suffers a severely and permanently
disfiguring injury - again without very much loss of income,
although you can imagine cases in which there is serious loss of
income with such an injury - and again without very much loss
of medical expense, because there are limits on the extent to which
even the cost of plastic surgery would be incurred in such a case.
These kinds of specialized injuries led Professor O'Connell and
me to the conclusion that another route to reform should be
I A more detailed discussion of the cost-equity dilemma appears in R.
KEETON, VENTuRiNG To Do JusTMcE 136-39 (1969).
[Vol. 74
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considered. One might consider a minimum modification of the
extreme position just outlined. This variation would eliminate all
the tort actions just as the AIA proposal, New York proposal and
Davies proposal would do, but would make some provision within
the nonfault insurance coverage itself for these specialized cases.
In some of the other proposals, and even at one stage in the
American Insurance Association proposal itself, there have been
suggestions of this type.
Once one undertakes to move along this route, he begins to
face more problems. One is the cost part of the cost-equity dilemma.
That is, if you undertake to make awards for "general damages" as
well as for economic losses, it may turn out that the total cost of the
system exceeds that of present liability insurance. That does not
mean it would be a bad bargain; indeed, it would be a better bargain
anyway because you would be getting so much more for your
insurance dollar. You would be providing all injury victims with
these benefits rather than just those who are now able to get them
as a result of the operation of the fault and tort system. But even
though it might be a good bargain, nevertheless it will be necessary
to face the issue - and to face it in legislatures - of a probable
increase of insurance costs. That has a different ring in legislative
halls from a proposal as to which the companies, who will be
responsible for writing the coverage, are prepared to come in and
say, as they were in Massachusetts in 1970, "We will be willing
to write this proposal at reduced insurance costs." And in
Massachusetts they even put in a specific figure, a fifteen percent
reduction from then current rates,12 which were conceded on all
hands to be too low to cover actual costs. This meant that the real
saving was much more than fifteen percent - probably thirty-five
to forty percent, even on the basis of advance estimates. Early
returns show the actual savings to be greater than anyone predicted.
Turn now to the second of the five positions in the spectrum.
This is where the Basic Protection Plan, which Professor O'Connell
and I have advanced, would fit. We proposed a tort exemption that
would eliminate the tort actions in all but the cases of severe injury.
It would preserve the tort actions in cases of severe injury in order
to meet this problem of equity among victims without necessarily
incurring higher costs than it seemed to us to be feasible or practicable
to expect society to accept.
12 MAss. Acrs of 1970 ch. 670.
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Our proposal was made at a time before cost studies on the
practical operation of nonfault insurance were available. Shortly
after advancing the proposal, we arranged for a cost study by Frank
Harwayne of New York City."3 Subsequently, the American
Insurance Association also made - and to their credit, published -
a very significant cost study.'4 Still later the New York Insurance
Department made and published a cost study. 5 As a result of these
cost studies, it now appears to me and I think to others generally that
the savings from a nonfault insurance system in comparison with a
liability insurance system are substantially greater than Professor
O'Connell and I anticipated. It makes feasible a movement nearer to
the American Insurance Association position than we thought practi-
cable at the time of our original proposal. It has led us to suggest, in a
recent article in the Columbia Law Review,' 6 that in addition to pre-
serving the tort actions for the severe injury cases, we would favor of-
fering to policyholders on an optional basis an opportunity to buy
additional coverage for nonfault benefits without limit as to economic
losses. This option would offer the same kind of coverage the Ameri-
can Insurance Association plan proposes, with the condition attached
that one would give up his tort claims completely. In other words, we
think it would be feasible to have a compulsory nonfault coverage
protecting everybody in all but the severe injury cases, preserving
tort actions in those cases, and then offering each policyholder the
opportunity to make the choice for himself that he would rather be
protected against economic losses without limit than to have the
tort action available if he should happen to be the victim in one of
those distinctive kinds of injuries referred to in the preceding
discussion.
From the point of view of equity, the matter looks very different
if we give each policyholder a choice ahead of time. Under the
present tort system he is unprotected to a considerable extent from
the economic losses of the most severe injuries. It is a lucky man
' See F. HARWAYNE, AUTOMOBILE BASIC PROTECTION COSTS EVALUATED
(1968) (multititled, with Foreward of December, 1968, comparing findings of
Harwayne's earlier studies with those of the AIA Report); Harwayne,
Insurance Costs of Basic Protection Plan in Michigan, 1967 U. ILL. L. FORUM
479 (1967), also published in CRIsis IN CAR INSURANCE 119 (R. Keeton, J.
O'Connell & J. McCord ed. 1967).
14 AIA REPORT.
5 N.Y. INS. DEP'T REPORT.
- ' 6 Keeton & O'Connell, Alternative Paths Toward Nonfault Automobile
Insurance, 71 COLrMs. L. REv. 241 (1971).
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indeed - lucky in that secondary sense concerned with what happens
after he is unluckily a victim of severe injury - who finds that
there is a financially responsible source as well as a good tort action
to take care of his economic losses without limit. That is a very
rare occurrence today. It is an entirely rational choice, though
not the only choice one might make, to say, "I would rather be
protected against economic loss without limit and give up my right
to general damages than have it the other way around." We propose
to make that choice available to people for the first time. The present
system denies that freedom of choice.
To summarize, then, the second position on the spectrum -
represented by the Basic Protection Plan - would eliminate all
tort actions but those in severe injury cases and would provide the
option to each policyholder to go the further distance of eliminating
his tort actions completely in return for a guarantee to him of
unlimited nonfault coverage for economic losses.
The third route to reform might be referred to as "scaled-down
nonfault plans." Proposals of this type would eliminate tort actions
in the great body of cases that are cases of relatively minor injury,
but would preserve many more tort actions than the Basic Protection
Plan does. These proposals would preserve tort actions not just
in the severe injury cases, but as well in what we might refer to as
moderate injury cases. The Massachusetts Act, in operation since
January 1, 1971, is an illustration. The Florida Act, recently passed
and scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1972, is another
illustration. These two acts differ in details, but each contains a
list of special kinds of injuries. If you prove that you have sustained
one of the special kinds of injuries, you may recover in a tort action -
if you can also Drove tort liability. If you do not prove one of the
special kinds of injuries, then in order to have a tort action you must
prove that you have incurred more than a specified dollar loss. In
Massachusetts, it is $500 of medical expense. In Florida, it is $1,000
of medical and wage loss combined.
The same proposition may be stated from another point of
view, and this may help to clarify it. In Massachusetts you have no
tort action for pain and suffering unless you either have more than
$500 in medical expense or you have a certain kind of injury -
death, dismemberment, severe or permanent disfigurement, loss of
sight or hearing as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act, or
8
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fracture. I suppose "fracture" includes any kind of fracture - even
a hairline fracture not visible on X-rays. It may happen that in
Massachusetts fracture will replace whiplash as the most common
allegation in tort complaints.
The Florida Act has a tort exemption that is in total effect
about the same, but it is a little weaker in some respects and a
little stronger in others. The dollar figure there, instead of five
hundred dollars of medical, is a thousand dollars of medical and
wage loss. If you have more than a thousand dollars in medical and
wage loss, you have your pain and suffering claim. Also the list of
special kinds of injuries is a little different. The Florida Act tightened
the fracture provision. They had the benefit of advice of a doctor
legislator. To get over the hurdle into the tort action for pain and
suffering on the basis of fracture you must prove a fracture of a
weight-bearing bone or a compound, comminuted, displaced or
depressed fracture. There will be fewer cases going into the tort
category on the basis of fracture than in Massachusetts. But Florida
lowered the threshold in another respect: You can recover for pain
and suffering if you prove a permanent loss of bodily function. That
provision was in the Massachusetts draft bill at one point, but taken
out when discussion made it apparent that this would be a potentially
big opening. For example, probably it will be the case that if the
plaintiff testifies that, because his back now hurts as a result of the
accident, he cannot sit in his office chair longer than three hours and
he used to be able to sit there four, and his doctor says he does not
expect improvement, a jury finding of permanent loss of bodily
function will be supportable.
The fourth alternative among the different routes to reform is
the route of not eliminating but instead merely limiting the tort
action. Proposals of this type contain a provision saying that the
amount of recovery for pain and suffering will be limited by objective
criteria in certain cases. This is the kind of proposal that is supported
by the National Association of Independent Insurers and by the
American Mutual Insurance Alliance. An Act of this type has
been adopted in Illinois. This kind of plan usually has in it a
definition of special categories of injury somewhat like the special
categories in the Massachusetts bill and the Florida bill. As is the
case under these acts, here too you have your full tort action if you
can prove that you have sustained one of the special types of injury.
In the absence of that proof, however, your tort action is merely
[Vol. 74
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limited rather than eliminated. For example, the amount of recovery
for pain and suffering might be limited to fifty cents on each dollar of
medical expense up to five hundred dollars, and dollar for dollar
on medical expense above that amount. The effect is that in those
cases in which you cannot escape this limitation by proving you
have a special category of injury, the amount of recovery for pain and
suffering instead of being two, four, five, or even ten times the
specials, as happens under the tort system, is limited to fifty cents
on the dollar of medical for the first five hundred and dollar for
dollar above that.
The fifth alternative route is one of no tort limitation
whatsoever. I believe it is really misleading to refer to the proposals
of this type as nonfault insurance proposals. Certainly, they do not
attack the wastefulness, expense, and inequity of the distribution of
benefits characteristic of the fault system. Thus, they do not have
the characteristics of real reform that are associated with nonfault
proposals generally.
It is partly for political reasons, no doubt, that proponents of this
type of proposal wish it to be called a nonfault insurance proposal.
Included in this category is the act recently passed in Delaware, under
which compulsory nonfault insurance has simply been added on top
of the present tort system without eliminating the right to recover
in tort. Also included in this category are the acts recently passed
in Oregon and South Dakota, merely requiring companies to offer
nonfault insurance on an optional basis.
It is said by proponents of these proposals that they hope tort
actions will be reduced because people who have been paid for
their losses under the nonfault coverage promptly, efficiently, and
fairly, will not choose to go through litigation just for more
compensation. They argue that the perils and disadvantages of
litigation are deterrent enough to cause people just to "forget it"
instead of bringing their tort actions. I am deeply skeptical of this
suggestion. The dollar incentive to bring the tort action is still there,
and in a sense it is even increased because, as defense lawyers have
so often charged, 'The nonfault insurance will be used to finance the
tort action." That is, the claimant can use the nonfault insurance to
pay for all the medical expenses he incurs, and all the while he is
building up higher "specials" to increase the value of his tort claim
for general damages.
10
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IV. NATIONAL OR STATE SYSTEMS
In these remarks I have concentrated on what seem to me to be
the really critical questions about the characteristics of the com-
pensation system itself: first, the nonfault insurance, and, second,
the extent to which the tort action is to be reduced or eliminated.
Another problem that is destined to stir great debate concerns
implementation. By whom is nonfault insurance to be adopted, and
by whom administered? Shall we have one national system, or shall
we adhere to the familiar pattern of treating these as problems for
state rather than federal action?
A few years ago I would have thought it very unlikely that we
would have federal legislation simply because of the deep feelings of
so many in our society in favor of more localized centers of power
and control. However, it has been the observation of many people
on the Washington scene recently that the likelihood of federal
action is very much greater now than would have seemed possible
even as recently as a year ago. The only way of defeating proposals
for federal action is by quick and effective action in the states,
and effective action may involve a substantial approach to uniformity
in the eventual response of the states if not in the first-step response.
The Department of Transportation has entered into a contract
with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws for the drafting of a proposed Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident
Reparations Act. That project is proceeding on a rapid timetable.
A draft will be available before the end of this year, and probably
it will be placed before the National Conference of Commissioners
at their meeting next August for approval. Another factor that may
affect the federal-state accommodation is the likelihood that their
will be national health insurance in some form within a few years.
The form and character of that proposal will also have a bearing on
whether the medical expense portion of the automobile injury
problem is transferred over into a completely different system.
These are uncertainties that we - all of us who are interested
in the system for compensation of traffic victims - must be intensely
concerned with in the immediate years ahead. I have tried in these
remarks to place the whole range of nonfault proposals in perspective
as an aid to reasoned judgments about the issues we must face. I
make no secret of the fact that I have long since reached a conviction
that reform of the reparations system is essential. It also seems clear
J.Vol. 74
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to me that those of us who would prefer a state-regulated, private
enterprise system will have lost our last chance to head off federal
action of a more drastic type if we do not achieve our goal within the
immediate future. This means that a substantial number of states
must enact effective nonfault legislation in 1972.
Statutes of the fourth and fifth types described in these remarks
do not constitute effective nonfault legislation. I make this assertion
not merely as an expression of my own opinion but also as an
assessment of what views will prevail in the federal appraisal of state
legislation. Moreover, I believe statutes of the third type are an
insufficient response. Though the matter is more debatable at this
point, I believe also that state statutes of that type would not serve
to head off federal legislation. Thus, I continue to believe that the
public interest will be best served by state enactments of the second
type - enactments in the pattern of the Basic Protection Plan.
12
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